On October 1, 1999, the
United
States Information Agency ceased to exist. Its functions
were swallowed
up by the U.S. Department of State in what was essentially
described by
the Clinton administration as a cost-cutting move. The end
of the
agency came with virtually no fanfare or public notice.
This is in sharp contrast
to
the agency's creation in 1953. USIA's birth was in
response to the
threat of global communist expansion. It was an attempt to
win the
battle for hearts and minds, one waged with words and not
bullets.
At least that was what the public was told.
As previously classified
documents
demonstrate, the battle against international communism was just
one of
a number of factors that led to the birth of USIA.
There were
also concerns within government bureaucracy, the Congress, the
press and
the public relations profession over the scope and direction of
American
overseas information programs. While some felt the U.S.
should match
communist propaganda with its own variety, there were others who
felt that
American ideas and virtues needed no
embellishment.
There was also a question of oversight: Should overseas
information reflect
U.S. foreign policy aims as defined by the State Department, or
should
it reflect the independent and diverse voices of American public
opinion?
And, as is so often the case in government agencies, the impetus
for change
had as much to do with internal turf wars as it did the Cold
War.
The purpose of this paper
is
to examine the forces that led to the creation of USIA -- with a
special
focus upon the deliberations of the Jackson Committee.
This includes
a review of USIA's short-lived predecessor, the United States
International
Information Administration. It also briefly touches upon
USIA's dismantling
by the Clinton administration. While the post-Soviet world
at the
turn of the century is a much different place than the Cold War
world of
the early 1950s, many of the issues that attended the USIA at
its birth
remain relevant at its demise.
Propaganda - An Historical Perspective
"For a propagandist, and
I use
the word with pride, the United States is the best of clients --
and the
worst," wrote broadcast journalist/commentator John Chancellor,
who also
served two years as director of Voice of America. "Best because
of its
unmistakable virtues, worst because its vices can't be hidden."
(1)
For as long as humans
have organized
themselves into groups of shared values and concerns,
communication has
been used strategically to advance their self interests.
Archaeologists
have uncovered evidence dating back to 1,800 BC of primitive
agricultural
extension agents giving farmers advice on how to improve their
crop yield.
During the fifth century BC in the city-state of Athens, new
political
freedoms gave rise to the birth of rhetoric, the study of public
opinion
and how to influence it. A philosophy of vox populi, the
voice of
the people, was embraced four centuries later in the Roman
Republic.
The spread of Christianity during the Middle Ages was also
linked to strategic
communication. The faith was passed along by word of mouth
through
missionaries such as Francis of Assisi, who spread his teachings
of self-imposed
poverty and service to the poor across Europe and the Middle
East during
the 12th century. The Catholic Church’s efforts became
more formalized
in the 17th century with the establishment of the Congregato de
Propaganda
Fide for the purpose of spreading church doctrine. (2)
The use of strategic
communication
in the United States predates the founding of the nation.
Exaggerated
claims were often the basis for encouraging settlement of the
wilderness.
At first they were aimed at attracting Europeans to fledgling
East Coast
settlements. Later, the myth of frontiersman Daniel Boone
was created
to woo settlers into the new nation's interior. (3) During
the Revolutionary
War, Benjamin Franklin spread false stories about British
acquiescence
in Seneca Indian atrocities against colonists. He did so to
undermine the
British war effort and to bolster overseas public opinion in
favor of American
independence. (4) Less than a century later, President
Abraham Lincoln
delayed publication of the Emancipation Proclamation until he
could link
it to a Union victory in the battlefield. Lincoln did not
want the
abolishment of slavery (limited to the Confederate states) to be
seen as
an act of desperation. When Lincoln got a much-needed
victory at
the Battle of Antietam in September 1862, it gave the
proclamation credibility
and eliminated the threat of European intervention into the
American Civil
War. (5)
The history of the use of
propaganda
is somewhat confusing because its very definition is a matter of
dispute.
Historian Brett Gray wrote, "Propaganda as a label suffered (and
suffers)
from a certain imprecision; it is not unlike Justice Potter
Stewart's fabled
definition of pornography: 'I don't know how to define it, but I
know it
when I see it.'" (6) Webster's Dictionary defines
propaganda in a
broad context as "the propagating of doctrines or principles;
the opinions
or beliefs thus spread." (7) Taken quite literally, that
definition
implies that propaganda is an umbrella covering all forms of
persuasive
communication, including advertising and public relations.
In that
context, propaganda appears to be a kin to press agentry, which
Todd Hunt
and James E. Grunig described as being "public relations
programs whose
sole purpose is getting favorable publicity for an organization
in the
mass media." (8) Even the man considered the father of
modern public
relations, Edward L. Bernays, gave credence to this
interpretation when
he defined public relations -- the term he coined in his seminal
book Crystallizing
Public Opinion -- as "the new propaganda." (9)
However, that
interpretation
draws criticism from many quarters, especially communication
professionals.
Public relations historian Scott M. Cutlip wrote that Bernays'
efforts
to further define public relations in his 1928 book Propaganda
served only
to muddy the waters and "handed the infant field's critics a
club with
which to bludgeon it." (10) However originally intended,
propaganda
has become a pejorative term associated with the likes of Nazi
Propaganda
Minister Josef Goebbels. Gray argued that propaganda
should not be
confused with advertising and public relations. He wrote,
"For my
part, I try to maintain that distinction by defining propaganda
as the
organized manipulations of key cultural symbols and images (and
biases)
for the purposes of persuading a mass audience to take a
position, or move
to action, or remain inactive on a controversial
matter."(11) Historian
Leo Bogart wrote that the propaganda studies of the mid-1930s
were "prompted
by the assumption that the statements of totalitarian
governments represented
cunning and deliberate distortions of the truth to serve deeper
strategic
objectives." (12)
It is not just
communication
professionals who have sought to distance themselves from the
propaganda
label. The United States government has backed away from
that terminology
since an initial flirtation with it at the outbreak of the First
World
War. In what is a common government tactic, officials have
attached
the label "public diplomacy" to the effort to influence foreign
public
opinion. However, few are fooled by the use of creative
language.
USIA veteran Fitzhugh Green acknowledged in his 1988 book
American Propaganda
Abroad that public diplomacy is "a euphemism for the word modern
Americans
abhor - propaganda." (13)
The same skittishness
holds
true for the more benign term "public relations." Although
thousands of
public relations practitioners are employed in all levels of
government,
they tend to operate under stealth job titles such as press
secretary,
public information officer, public affairs officer, and
communications
specialist. As early as 1913, Congress adopted the Gillett
amendment,
which declared that "appropriated funds may not be used to pay a
publicity
expert unless specifically appropriated for that purpose." (14)
It is important to
remember
that the term "propaganda" did not hold the same meaning during
the first
two decades of the last century. When the United States
was drawn
into global conflict in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson saw the
creation
of the Committee on Public Information as a necessary
counterweight against
the propaganda of the Central Powers. He appointed a
long-time friend
and political ally, newspaperman George Creel, to head its
operations.
Creel saw the application of American-style propaganda as being
preferable
to the wartime censorship favored by some in the military.
However
well-intentioned, CPI had its critics. As David M. Kennedy
has written:
"According to historians critical of Creel's work, CPI propaganda 'frequently wore a benign face, and ... its creators genuinely believed it to be in the service of an altruistic cause,' but on the whole it showed an 'overbearing concern for correct opinion, for expression, for language itself.' Creel's agency promoted jingoism, intolerance, and vigilantism, an assessment that quickly became the reigning interpretation of both Creel's legacy and, at war's end, of the powers of propaganda." (15)As the public became disenchanted with the outcome of the so-called "war to end all wars," propaganda became a source of widespread concern. One postwar researcher wrote, "As writers for popular magazines reevaluated the nation's experience with war propaganda, there was more shock and concern about precisely this aspect of the propaganda than any other: the fact that propaganda appeared to be a force of boundless power." (16)
"The struggle abounded in personalities, but was not fundamentally personal. It rested on differences between those who believed that propaganda should form part of the program of subversive operations, and should consist of any action, true or false, responsible or irresponsible, which would effectively hamper the enemy at any point; and those who believed that propaganda should be a public, responsible government operation to tell the truth about the war, about the United States and its allies, as a means of describing democracy and freedom, our war aims, and our determination to win both the war and the peace." (21)At the start the Cold War era, there was a reluctance among U.S. government officials toward having their strategic communication activities perceived as propaganda. Former Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark.) once echoed this sentiment when he said, "there is something basically unwise and undemocratic about a system which taxes the public to finance a propaganda campaign aimed at persuading the same taxpayers that they must spend more tax dollars to subvert their independent judgment." (22) Nevertheless, there were others who felt the government should be doing more to counter the communists. Allen M. Wilson, vice president of The Advertising Council, told a New York gathering on March 22, 1949, "Is propaganda an effective weapon? It must be. How else, since the communists have nothing to offer France but promises, could the communist leaders have captured control of great sections of the French labor movement?" (23)
Truman and "The Campaign of Truth"
The realization that the
United
States needed to engage in an aggressive campaign of strategic
communication
came slowly to President Harry S Truman. When Truman
signed an executive
order abolishing the OWI on August 31, 1945, he said, "This
government
will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing
information programs
of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to it
that other
peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and the
aims and
policies of the United States government." (24) To
John B.
Whitton, founder of the Princeton Listening Center for the Study
of Political
Broadcasting, Truman had erred. "Our failure to understand
(political
communication's) proper role was sharply demonstrated....when
President
Truman, by decree, almost completely demolished the formidable
information
apparatus so laboriously assembled during the war." (25)
Truman's acceptance of
strategic
communication in the national interest appeared to evolve over
the next
two years as a result of both foreign and domestic
pressures. According
to historian Richard M. Freeland, Truman administration
officials were
frustrated by the communists' ability to influence public
opinion through
use of "apparently patriotic appeals or organizations that
concealed their
relationship to the communist movement" -- a coalition that
President Truman
referred to as "reds, phonies and parlor pinks." However,
Freeland wrote
that by March 1947, "the Administration had devised no effective
tool to
combat it." (26)
Domestic politics also
played
an important role in this evolution. Truman suffered from
comparison
with his dynamic and martyred predecessor. The mounting
economic
and social strains on post-war America appeared to be too much
for the
man from Missouri. A popular joke of the day ended with
the punch
line "I wonder what Truman would do if he were alive." A
Boston advertising
agency developed a devastatingly effective two-word campaign
slogan for
Republican candidates, "Had enough?" In the November 1946
mid-term
elections, Republicans scored a stunning triumph, taking control
of the
Senate, the House and a majority of state
governorships-. Truman's
popularity had plunged 50 points in one year to just 32
percent.
His chances of being elected in his own right in 1948 appeared
to be a
remote possibility at best. (27)
Truman's embrace of
strategic
communications evolved over the next two years. The
initial step
in this evolution came on March 12, 1947, when the president
first articulated
what would become known as the Truman Doctrine in a nationally
broadcast
speech before a joint session of Congress. The purpose of
the speech
was to announce a $400 million economic and military aid package
for Greece
and Turkey. The fear was that British disengagement
because of post-war
financial strains would leave that area of the world open to
Soviet domination.
President Truman told the Congress and the nation "I believe
that it must
be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who
are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside
pressures." (28)
Prior to the speech,
Assistant
Secretary of State Will Clayton wrote in a memorandum that "the
United
States will not take world leadership effectively unless the
people of
the United States are shocked into doing so." (29) The
GOP-dominated
Congress had demonstrated an aversion to foreign aid
programs. The
Republican landslide had brought with it a new crop of lawmakers
to Capitol
Hill of whom Melvyn P. Leffler wrote, "Their concerns with
overseas developments
were limited; their willingness to incur shortages or postpone
tax reductions
was nonexistent. They were still committed to America
first, and
their antipathy to foreign entanglements and financial
sacrifices were
pronounced." (30)
This attitude appeared to
mirror
the prevailing feeling among the American people. The
election results
suggested that voters were tired of foreign
entanglements.
At the same time, in the eyes of a number of observers, the
Russians had
appeared to moderate their aggressiveness. (31) Senator
Arthur Vandenberg
(R-Mich.) told the president that he would have to "scare the
hell out
of the country" to win approval of the Greco-Turkish aid
package. (32)
Freeland wrote that Truman's speech was designed to do just that
-- elevate
the situation in Greece and Turkey to the level of a crisis and
to wrap
the loan package in anti-communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric that
Congress
was more likely to embrace. (33) The Truman Doctrine
speech established
the philosophical and rhetorical tone for the announcement of
the administration's
signature foreign aid program, the Marshall Plan, later that
same year.
Following the declaration
of
the Truman Doctrine, the administration and Congress each tried
to convince
the public that it was "tougher than the other guy" when it came
to communism.
Overseas information programs were at the heart of this
competition.
The administration consolidated the State Department's Office of
International
Information and Cultural Affairs (a direct descendent of OWI)
into a new
Office of International Information and Educational Exchange in
the fall
of 1947. (34) However, to a Congress unhappy with what it
saw as
a timid American response to Russian propaganda, this was not
enough.
Just a few months later, this arrangement was superseded by the
Smith-Mundt
Act, which authorized the government to globally disseminate
information
about the United States and its policies. (35)
World events began to
frame
the debate. The Berlin blockade and the anti-communist,
anti-administration
rhetoric of the Republican-controlled Congress led to the
creation of the
Office of International Information and even larger, more
aggressive overseas
information program. (36) By the beginning of 1950, public
pressure
was building on President Truman to move beyond his policy of
containment
to one where the country would more aggressively engage
communism in a
variety of venues -- including the field of propaganda. As
McCullough
wrote, "With the onrush of so much sensational, seemingly
inexplicable
bad news -- China lost, the Russian bomb, Alger Hiss, the
treason of Klaus
Fuchs -- breaking with such clamor, all in less than six months,
the country
was in a state of terrible uncertainty." (37) Adding to
the sense
of public fear was Life, which devoted a single issue to
the growing
strength of the Russian military. (38)
Into this atmosphere of
fear
plunged Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisc.), who launched a
full-fledged
assault on the Truman Administration on February 9, 1950.
In a Wheeling,
W.Va. speech, McCarthy charged that the State Department was
"riddled"
with 205 "known" communist sympathizers and traitors.
Although McCarthy's
numbers kept changing with every new public appearance, he
commanded center
stage. This, in turn, led to the Subversive Control Act of
1950 and
congressional probes into State Department employee loyalty.
(39)
It also increased pressure on the administration to explain its
policy
of containing communism.
Pressure to act also came
from
within the administration. On April 7, 1950, Truman was
confronted
by NSC-68, a National Security Council white paper which said
that the
administration's efforts to contain communism amounted to little
more than
a policy of bluff without adequate military force to back it
up.
NSC-68 advocated a massive military rearmament. The
estimated cost
of such a build-up was $40 to $50 billion, three times the
existing military
budget. (40) This would require a public debate in
which the
government's goals were clearly articulated. It may have
also led
Truman to a conclusion that most public relations practitioners
and advertising
executives instinctively understood -- that no good deed should
go unnoticed.
To put it another way, Truman had to do more than fight
communism.
He had to be seen fighting communism.
These many pressures
culminated
in the president's embrace of persuasive communication as an
instrument
of U.S. foreign policy. In an April 20, 1950, speech
before a meeting
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Truman articulated
his vision
of strategic communication and gave that vision a name:
"The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world by the forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of man. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by truth -- plain, simple, unvarnished truth -- presented by newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust." (41)Truman told the editors that his administration would embark upon a "Campaign of Truth." He said this campaign was "as important as armed strength or economic aid." (42) Truman's words would take on added weight within two months with the outbreak of the Korean War.
The International Information Administration
With just over one year
remaining
in the Truman administration, the State Department announced the
creation
of the United States International Information
Administration. The
IIA was created "for the conduct of the Department's
international information
and educational exchange programs." (43)
IIA's creation grew, in
part,
out of a rift between the Economic Cooperation Administration
and the United
States International Information and Exchange Program.
While there
were other domestic and foreign influences on this debate, this
was, essentially,
a turf battle along the lines articulated by the Brookings
Institute in
1948. USIE was the operating agency responsible for the
State Department's
foreign information and exchange program. (44) In
1949, Congress
also authorized ECA to publicize its Marshall Plan programs in
the participating
countries. (45) It wasn't long before the two public
information
staffs began stepping upon each other's toes.
Assistant Secretary of
State
for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett wrote on January 5, 1951,
that once
the need to publicize the Marshall Plan had diminished, ECA's
public information
staff began straying from its original mission. "The ECA
boys have,
naturally, tended to keep themselves busy by broadening out
their activities,"
Barrett complained in a memorandum to his superiors.
"Bluntly, in
order to keep their large mechanism busy they are, consciously
or unconsciously,
moving into the whole USIE field." (46)
"Some of the ECA
information
officers, fighting for their own continued existence, have done
some disparaging
of our operations among members of Congress and others, on the
grounds
that we are too hemmed in by diplomatic considerations," Barrett
continued.
"There is an absence of a clear line of demarcation between the
functions
of the two agencies." (47)
As Barrett's memorandum
suggests,
this infighting had caught the attention of Congress.
Senator William
Benton (D-Conn.), who left an advertising and publishing career
in 1945
to become Truman's first appointee to head the Office of
International
Information and Cultural Affairs, OWI's successor agency, had a
special
interest. In a December 14, 1950, letter to Secretary of
State Dean
Acheson, Benton wrote that he had been approached by a number of
senators
to introduce a bill to "take propaganda operations out of the
State Department."
(48) This wasn't a new idea: The Hoover Commission
report on
foreign affairs had recommended a year earlier that foreign
information
programs be moved out of the State Department. (49)
In reply to Benton’s
letter,
Acheson wrote, "My own judgment is that the expanded information
program
has in fact become the vital part of our national strategy you
and others
have always believed it should be.
"I am above all concerned that we do not at
this
critical period lose any of the vigor and momentum already
gained, nor
impair the close and effective working relationships which now
assure that
our overseas information output is constantly giving the maximum
of fully
coordinated support to current foreign policy decisions." (50)
There is irony in
Acheson's
response. The State Department's attitude toward foreign
information
programs was decidedly mixed. Fitzhugh wrote that while many in
the department
viewed overseas public relations as "harmless and vapid,"
professional
diplomats kept a "fish eye" on this effort "lest it damage
official American
relationships with foreign nations." (51)
The creation of IIA as a
semi-autonomous
agency on January 16, 1952, was designed to end the ECA-USIE
turf battle
and maintain State Department control over overseas public
information
programs. Fitzhugh wrote that Truman also hoped that the
appointment
of long-time lobbyist Wilson S. Compton as the IIA's first
administrator
would ease some of the pressure emanating from Capitol Hill.
(52)
Under this reorganization, IIA's administrator reported directly
to the
Secretary of State. While the Assistant Secretary of State
for Public
Affairs continued to serve as "the officer responsible for
advising the
Secretary on opinion and attitude factors in the development of
foreign
policy," he had no supervisory authority over a diminished USIE
program
and was empowered to provide only "broad guidance" to IIA. (53)
"It is clearly desirable
that
there should be a single U.S. program in the field of
international information,"
wrote Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Carlise
H. Humelsine.
(54) "The Department is now in a far stronger position
than ever
before to develop and apply sound information policy and to take
into account
in all of its actions the sound maxim that 'action is the best
propaganda.'"
(55)
While the creation of IIA
supposedly
settled the debate as far as the Truman State Department was
concerned,
it did not quell the criticism of those outside the
department. On
June 30, 1952, the Senate created a special subcommittee of the
Foreign
Relations Committee charged with examining overseas information
programs.
Among its members was the aforementioned Senator Benton.
In an interim
report issued January 30, 1953, the subcommittee said these
programs needed
strengthening. (56)
Even within IIA, there
was a
realization that the controversy over the control of overseas
information
programs had not been decided. Compton wrote Acheson in
July 1952
that the agency "still has more problems than answers."
(57) At about
the same time, Compton told Congress that IIA "is not as good as
its most
enthusiastic advocates claim. It is not as bad as its
severest critics
say." (58)
While Senator McCarthy --
somewhat
predictably -- was one of those "severest critics," he wasn't
alone in
his criticism of IIA. "Members of Congress feared its
potential to
serve as an organ of the executive branch; State Department
traditionalists
resented its incursions into conventional forms of diplomacy,"
wrote historian
Jeff Broadwater. (59) He also wrote that budget-minded
politicians,
who saw the agency's $100 million annual budget as being far
more tangible
than its results, looked upon IIA as "a giant boondoggle."
(60) At
the start of 1953, the agency was faced with four congressional
probes,
including a McCarthy committee investigation into the location
and construction
of two Voice of America transmitters. If that wasn't
enough uncertainty,
the IIA was also confronted with the reality that the election
of a new
president would likely result in significant philosophical
changes.
Taking A New Direction
The direction of U.S.
overseas
information programs changed with the election of a new
president in November
1952. With Harry Truman, the nation had a leader who had
slowly embraced
the value of strategic communication in the pursuit of foreign
policy goals.
However, Dwight David Eisenhower had a well-established record
of using
public relations as an instrument of his leadership.
That had
been evident from the moment he stepped foot in England 10 years
earlier
to lead the Allied effort during the Second World War.
"Eisenhower
proved to be outstanding at public relations," historian Stephen
E. Ambrose
wrote. "He was more aware of the importance of the press,
and better
at using it, than any other public figure of his day." (61)
Eisenhower's emphasis on
public
relations carried over to his days in the White House.
During a September
1953 staff meeting, Eisenhower described his public relations
philosophy
as "nothing in the world but getting ideas put out in such a way
that your
purpose is actually understood by all people that need to
understand it
in order to get it done efficiently and well." (62) The
significance
of this statement is the implication that Eisenhower had an
Aristotlean
approach to persuasion, one that James Grunig has described in
public relations
terms as a compliance-gaining tactic. (63) What is also
significant
is that this philosophy is contrary to an approach of using
propaganda
as a tool of American foreign policy.
In fairness to President
Truman,
the goals of his "Campaign of Truth" appear to be
philosophically compatible
with Eisenhower's view of public relations. Both men felt
it was
unnecessary to embellish the truth. But the continuing
bureaucratic
struggle over control and content contributed to a growing
public impression
that American overseas information programs were unfocused and
ineffective.
It came as no surprise
that
Eisenhower made the nation's cold war "psychological strategy" a
campaign
issue during an October 8, 1952, speech in San Francisco.
"Many people
think 'psychological warfare' means just the use of propaganda
like the
controversial Voice of America," Eisenhower said.
"Certainly, the
use of propaganda, of the written and spoken word, of every
means to transmit
ideas, is an essential part of winning other people to your
side.
"But propaganda is not
the most
important part of this struggle," Eisenhower said. "The
present Administration
has never yet been able to grasp the full import of a
psychological effort
put forth on a national scale." (64)
Eisenhower specifically
singled
out the State Department when criticizing the Truman
administration for
compartmentalizing the nation's response to the Cold War.
"We shall
no longer have a Department of State that deals with foreign
policy in
an aloof cluster," Eisenhower said. "The Administration in
power
has failed to bring into line its criss-crossing and overlapping
and jealous
departments and bureaus and agencies." (65)
Just six days after
taking the
oath of office, President Eisenhower appointed the President's
Committee
on International Information Activities. It became widely
known as
the "Jackson Committee" because of its two most prominent
members, William
H. Jackson, the managing partner of a New York investment firm
and the
committee's chairman, and C.D. Jackson, a Time-Life executive
who had become
one of Eisenhower's closest advisers. It was C.D. Jackson,
who had
been an adviser to General Eisenhower on psychological warfare
matters
during the Second World War, who first suggested the creation of
the committee.
In a November 26, 1952, memorandum, he urged the President-elect
to appoint
a panel to recommend the future direction for U.S. government
and psychological
warfare programs. (66)
Other members of the
committee
were New York advertising executive Sigurd Larmon, University of
North
Carolina President Gordon Gray, New Jersey businessman Barklie
McKee Henry,
and New York textile executive John C. Hughes. General
Mills executive
Abbott Washburn served as the executive secretary of the
committee.
All of the members, except Larmon, had military experience in
either intelligence
or psychological warfare. Most had media experience.
The committee's
final report was due no later than June 30, 1953. (67)
In a letter to the
executive
secretary of the National Security Council, Eisenhower said the
purpose
of the committee was "to make a survey and evaluation of the
international
information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of
the Government
and of policies and activities related thereto with particular
reference
to the international relations and the national security of this
country."
The President went on to say, "It has long been my conviction
that a unified
and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of
the United
States and of the peoples in the community of free nations."
(68)
Committee Deliberations
The Jackson Committee
met for
the first time on January 30, 1953. In the five months of
deliberations
that followed, the committee and its staff interviewed over 250
witnesses.
Numerous individuals and organizations also submitted written
suggestions.
(69) While the Jackson Committee was the focal point of
the debate
over the future direction of American overseas information
programs, it
was hardly the only game in town. Typical of Washington,
several
congressional and executive branch committees -- each with their
own agenda
-- laid statutory claim to a particular corner of the
debate. Also
weighing in with their opinions were the media and public
relations practitioners.
The challenge for
Eisenhower
was simple to define but difficult to accomplish. He faced
a balancing
act of paying lip-service to the many competing interests while
maintaining
control over the debate. As events unfolded, it became
obvious that
the many outside players were successful in garnering the thing
they wanted
most, media coverage. However, the record suggests that
Eisenhower
got the control he wanted. Most notably, Eisenhower did
not choose
to wait until his hand-picked panel had delivered its
recommendations before
beginning the process of reshaping American overseas information
programs.
It didn't take long for
Congress
to jump into the fray. On February 20, the Senate extended
the life
of a special subcommittee investigating overseas information
programs until
June 30, the same day the Jackson Committee report was
due. The Hickenlooper
Committee, chaired by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa),
held a series
of hearings March 6 through May 13. (70) In a March 16
hearing, Lewis
K. Gough, national commander of the American Legion, recommended
that all
U.S. information and counter-propaganda programs be consolidated
under
a new Cabinet-level agency.
In a 44-page memorandum,
Hickenlooper
Committee staff outlined a litany of criticisms of and
suggestions for
improving overseas information programs. Committee staff
concluded
that "Congress and the American people lack an accurate
definition of what
we are attempting to accomplish with overseas information
programs."
The report stated that the program had "strayed too far" from
its original
purpose and "has become increasingly less effective as it has
become more
an instrument of propaganda and less an instrument of
information."
And in a suggestion that undoubtedly caused concern at the White
House,
the committee staff recommended that Congress take a stronger
role in determining
overseas information policy. (71)
A similar proposal had
been
made three weeks earlier to the McCarthy committee from the
Advisory Commission
on Information, a five-member panel of specialists outside of
government
created by President Truman to review the operations of the
IIA.
The commission also recommended increased congressional
oversight of international
information programs and urged the United States to pursue a
more aggressive
information program. (72)
As already noted, this
proposal
came at a time McCarthy had his sights on the IIA. His
committee
had been probing allegations of waste and subversion at VOA.
However, that
probe expanded. McCarthy's staff had claimed that IIA
overseas libraries
had become a repository for "more than 30,000 books by Communist
authors
or those who have aided the Communist cause." (73) This
led to nervous
librarians banning some books and burning others -- developments
that appalled
Eisenhower. (74) While the activities of the McCarthy
committee did
not directly affect the deliberations of the Jackson Committee,
it is clear
from the volume of archived memoranda and newspaper clippings
that the
activities of the Wisconsin senator were being closely
monitored.
Congressional reaction to
the
proposal to create a new Cabinet-level propaganda agency was
mixed.
Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), the ranking minority member
on the
McCarthy committee, said the proposal "doesn't make any sense."
(75)
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said the only way to save
overseas information
programs from "certain death" was to transfer it from the State
Department
to an new federal agency. Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.),
a member
of both the McCarthy and Hickenlooper committees, predicted that
the government's
various overseas information programs would be placed under one
head. (76)
The Jackson Committee
also received
indirect input from the President's Advisory Committee on
Government Organization,
chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller. The Rockefeller
Committee
urged the Eisenhower administration to "establish a new foreign
information
agency, in which would be consolidated the most important
foreign information
programs and cultural and educational exchange programs now
carried on
by the United States International Information Administration,
by the Technical
Cooperation Administration, by the Mutual Security Agency, and
by the Department
of State in connection with the Government of Occupied
Areas." The
Rockefeller Committee recommended that the new agency be
established under
the National Security Council. (77)
Various journalists,
through
newspaper columns, contributed their thoughts on the proper role
of U.S
overseas information. The volume of newspaper clippings
found in
committee files suggests that these opinions were not
ignored. And
the tone of much of this commentary was along the lines of the
editorial
opinion of The Washington Post, which said
"Psychological warfare,
in addition to being contrary to the American way of doing
things, is antithetical
to the American way of life." (78) Columnists Joseph
and Stewart
Alsop wrote "Democracy cannot be peddled like soap flakes."
(79)
Walter Lippmann, who wanted to abolish the Voice of America,
wrote, "In
a society where opinions are free, a government propaganda,
which is a
monopoly, is an inherent contradiction and practically
unworkable." (80)
In an interesting twist,
James
Reston of The New York Times wrote that the process of
deciding
upon a national overseas information strategy was too
public. "In
short, the criticism being made here against the President and
his Secretary
of State is that they launched their psychological offensive and
then appointed
a committee to study it and a White House official to coordinate
it, instead
of the other way around." (81)
On at least one occasion,
the
work of the Jackson Committee was a source of amusement for the
media.
In the days leading up to the creation of the committee, Defense
Secretary-designate
C.E. Wilson suggested that radio entertainer Arthur Godfrey be
named to
the panel because "Godfrey knows how to reach the mass
mind." Joseph
and Stewart Alsop wrote "this kind of naivete can be dangerous
in the extreme."
(82)
Then there was the
reaction
of Radio Budapest, which was confused by the presence of W.H.
Jackson and
C.D. Jackson on the committee. In a blistering
denunciation of the
committee, Radio Budapest implied that the two men were the same
person.
"A few days ago it was announced that Eisenhower had set up a
new body
called the 'Strategic Office of Psychological Warfare' which
will be entrusted
with the task of centrally directing the slander campaign
against the free
peoples as well as the espionage and subversive activities," a
Hungarian
commentator said. "Whom else could he have appointed as
head of the
new office than Mr. Jackson, the astutest forger of slanders and
organizer
of espionage?" This broadcast, in turn, prompted a CIA
official to
suggest in a note to the two Jacksons that this new "composite
arch fiend
of espionage and slander" be named "The Super Jackson." (83)
Public relations
professionals
also took a keen interest in the Jackson Committee.
"Psychological warfare
must be an integral part of our national policy, not a thing
apart," said
public relations pioneer Edward L. Bernays. "The
government should
use social scientists who understand our activities as they
relate to other
countries." (84) Thomas J. Deegan, Jr., vice
president and
director of C&O Railway Company, told participants in a
public relations
workshop that the U.S. was "naive" in its counter propaganda and
that the
government had "traded down" public relations by using
inadequately trained
"press-release men." (85)
Perhaps the most
comprehensive
recommendations came from the weekly newsletter Public
Relations News.
Shortly before the Jackson Committee forwarded its final report
to Eisenhower,
PR
News Publisher and Editor Denny Griswold made 14
suggestions for improving
U.S. overseas information efforts. Committee files suggest
that Griswold
was well known to the committee and had met with its
staff. Her suggestions
included the establishment of a Cabinet-level information agency
divorced
from the State Department. "Set up an independent agency,
free to
operate a fast-moving, modern program where timeliness takes
precedence
over protocol," Griswold wrote. "Junk such terms as 'cold
war,' 'psychological
warfare' and 'political warfare,' and use new terms which better
describe
the policies of our non-bellicose nation." (86)
Committee staff
member Lewis C. Mattison, in a critique of Griswold's
recommendations,
wrote that "several of her numbered points should not gain
currency."
For example, Mattison said, "Cabinet rank is newspaper talk."
(87)
The Committee Report
The Jackson Committee
submitted
its formal report on June 30, 1953. However, by the time
the report
was in the President's hands, Eisenhower had already stolen much
of its
thunder. On June 1, the White House sent Congress
Reorganization
Plan No. 8 of 1953, which created the United States Information
Agency.
In many ways, it mirrored the Rockefeller Committee’s
recommendations.
USIA represented a consolidation of overseas information
programs administered
by IIA, the Mutual Security Agency, the Technical Cooperation
Administration,
and by programs financed in connection with government in
occupied areas.
However, the Rockefeller Committee’s recommendation that the new
agency
be established under the control of the NSC was rejected.
"While divesting the
Department
of State of the foreign information programs, the reorganization
plan does
not transfer the responsibility of that Department for the
educational
exchange programs authorized by various acts of Congress,"
Eisenhower's
message said. "Close coordination of our information and
educational
exchange programs will, of course, be effected by the Secretary
of State
and the Director of the United States Information Agency." (88)
The Jackson Committee
report
favored the consolidation of foreign information services.
In a news
release issued July 8, the committee said, "Lack of coordination
and planning
in the past has resulted in the haphazard projection of too many
and too
diffuse information themes. No single set of ideas has
been registered
abroad through effective repetition." (89)
However, where
such a
new agency should be housed was another matter. Noting
that the White
House had already sent its proposal to Capitol Hill, the Jackson
Committee
declined to make a specific recommendation. But the report
did say,
"In our opinion, the most satisfactory arrangement would be to
retain within
the Department of State those functions now assigned the IIA and
combine
them with the information activities handled by MSA and TCA."
(90)
In a strategic footnote, the Jackson report stated that the
committee had
considered the recommendations of the Hickenlooper and
Rockefeller committees
to remove overseas information functions from the State
Department.
By declining to make a recommendation, the Jackson report
appears to have
acknowledged the political reality. (91)
Other aspects of the
Jackson
report met with administration approval and were eventually
adopted.
The committee recommended the creation of an Operations
Coordinating Board
under the National Security Council. In its July 8 news
release,
the committee said, "The Operations Coordinating Board is
designed to achieve
better integrated direction of the program of the United States
in the
world struggle and to fill the gap which has existed in the past
between
the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions
needed to
give effect to them." The board was comprised of the Under
Secretary
of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director
for Mutual
Security, the Director of Central Intelligence and a special
assistant
to the President. (92)
At the same time, the
Jackson
report recommended that the Psychological Strategy Board be
abolished.
President Truman created the PSB on April 4, 1951, "to authorize
and provide
for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct
within the framework
of approved national policies, of psychological operations." The
PSB had
been charged with reporting to the National Security Council "on
the Boards's
activities on the evaluation of the national psychological
operations,
including the implementation of approved objectives, policies,
and programs
by the departments and agencies concerned." The PSB role was
designed to
be that of strictly coordination. It did not conduct any
operations
of its own. (93)
With this recommendation,
the
Jackson Committee heeded the advice of Congress, the media and
public relations
practitioners who felt that the PSB had been established on a
false premise.
"It is founded upon the misconception that 'psychological
activities' and
'psychological strategy' somehow exist apart from official
policies and
actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this
field,"
the committee stated in its July 8 press release. "In
reality, there
is a 'psychological' aspect or implication to every diplomatic,
economic,
or military policy and action." (94)
The Jackson Committee
also objected
to the use of terms such as "psychological warfare" and "cold
war."
The committee report said "they should be discarded in favor of
others
which describe our true goals." (95)
One recommendation of the
committee
that won praise from both reporters and public relations
practitioners
was its rejection of the use of propaganda in pursuit of
American foreign
policy goals. "American broadcasts and printed materials should
concentrate
on objective, factual news reporting," the committee news
release said.
"The tone and content should be forceful and direct, but a
propagandist
note should be avoided." (96)
Analysis
The abolition of the IIA
and
the PSB, as well as the creation of the USIA, set the parameters
for government
overseas information programs for the remainder of the 20th
century.
The Jackson Committee, with the backing of Congress, journalists
and public
relations practitioners, rejected the use of state-sanctioned
propaganda
in the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives. In
keeping
with both Truman's and Eisenhower's philosophies, the Jackson
Committee
report promoted the use of overseas information programs as a
compliance
gaining tactic -- one which lets the facts speak for themselves.
Both Truman and
Eisenhower were
uneasy about using the propaganda tactics employed first by the
Nazis and
then by the Communists. At the same time, neither man did
a particularly
good job of articulating this view to either the public or to
people within
their administrations. Many times their public words --
especially
the use of rhetoric such as "campaign of truth" and
"psychological warfare"
-- led to a misreading of their true intentions. This was
due, in
part, to the political environment of the time. With the
"loss" of
China, the outbreak of the Korean War and the ranting of Senator
Joseph
McCarthy, no politician could afford being seen as being "soft"
on communism.
This confusion was also due, in part, to a lack of understanding
of how
public opinion was formed. The post-war era was a time in
which alternatives
to the so-called Magic Bullet Theory were just emerging.
Many still
believed that with the just the right combination of words you
could make
anyone do anything.
Freeland wrote that the
Truman
administration used two successful techniques to garner public
support
for perennially unpopular foreign aid programs. First, it
would interpret
world events within a framework consistent with the
administration's policy
aims. The administration would then cultivate the broadest
possible
acceptance of that framework. (97) However, Freeland also
wrote that
this "exaggerated representation of the dangers of international
and domestic
communism" were turned against Truman by his opponents in an
effort to
discredit the administration as the champion of the
anti-communism crusade.
(98)
In many respects,
Eisenhower
was also held hostage by the same double-edged sword. On
the one
hand, Eisenhower used the inflamed rhetoric of the day to
advance his administration's
Cold War strategy and partisan political goals. However,
that same
rhetoric also fueled Senator McCarthy's many challenges of
Eisenhower's
authority. In turn, this conflict helped fuel early
interpretations
of Eisenhower's legacy as that of an ineffective and unengaged
leader.
It wouldn't be until much later, after the declassification of
White House
documents, that an alternate view of Eisenhower would
emerge. That
view, articulated in Fred I. Greenstein's The Hidden-Hand
Presidency,
is of a president who behind the scenes helped orchestrate
McCarthy's eventual
demise. (99)
Truman and Eisenhower
also had
to deal with the bureaucratic debate over where to house
overseas information
programs. There was considerable sentiment during both
administrations
that these programs needed to administered outside of the State
Department.
The creation of IIA was the result of an internal review done
mostly outside
of the public's view. While Truman compromised on some
points, he
decided to leave most of these functions under a State
Department umbrella.
Eisenhower's creation of the Jackson Committee was a very public
act designed
to demonstrate a strong hand on the reins of government at the
start of
his administration. However, this high profile proved to
be a mixed
blessing. The process was exposed to the pressures of
public opinion
and intense congressional oversight. By the time the
Jackson Committee
had concluded that overseas information programs should be under
State
Department control, Eisenhower had already short-circuited that
proposal
with Reorganization Plan No. 8.
The two leaders
eventually came
to the same realization -- that public information programs play
an important
role in implementing foreign policy. However, Truman did
not come
to appreciate this until late in his administration. This
was evidenced
by his summary dismantling of OWI in August 1945. It
wasn't until
he unleashed his "Campaign of Truth" -- first in spirit and
later in name
-- that Truman advocated an aggressive program of public
information.
In contrast, Eisenhower viewed public relations as an important
tool of
his leadership. As Ambrose has written, Eisenhower had
used public
relations and media manipulation to advance the Allied cause
during World
War II. (100) It came as no surprise that the
direction of
overseas information programs was one of the earliest foci of
his administration.
It also led to the Reston criticism -- one echoing the
complaints of others
-- that the overseas information policy debate had become too
public.
Echoes of the Past
When it comes to U.S.
overseas
information programs, that which is past is truly
prologue. It appears
that many of the same issues raised during the early 1950s
reemerged during
the 1990s with much different results.
Under the direction of
Vice
President Al Gore, the Clinton administration embarked upon a
cost-cutting
program in 1993, the National Performance Review. USIA was
one of
the agencies targeted for fat-trimming. In a September 7,
1993, statement,
Gore announced that USIA was reducing the number of its overseas
libraries
and reference centers. "Eliminating some of these
facilities or turning
them over to their host countries could save an estimated $51.5
million
through 1999," Gore said. (101) The significance here is
that Gore
was talking about belt-tightening at USIA, not its elimination.
Less than a year later,
there
was a discernable change in tone. At that time, Gore said,
"It is
imperative that both the State Department and USIA look for
efficiencies
and economies that result from the elimination of redundant
programs, duplicative
functions, and excess capacity in the infrastructure that
supports the
conduct of foreign affairs." (102) In the context of
the Jackson
Committee's deliberations 40 years earlier, this sounds a lot
like movement
toward the consolidation of overseas information programs under
a State
Department umbrella.
As late as February 15,
1995,
the White House remained committed to an independent USIA.
"After
a review under auspices of the Vice President's National
Performance Review,
the Administration concluded that USIA, AID and ACDA should
continue to
pursue their missions as independent agencies under the foreign
policy
direction of the Secretary of State." However, the same
White House
statement foreshadowed the future when it said, "The review the
Vice President
directed also concluded that the State Department, and each of
the other
agencies, should continue to conduct thorough reinvention
activities to
attain greater efficiency and effectiveness and eliminate
activities that
can no longer be justified." (103)
On December 30, 1998, the
White
House announced that USIA's functions would be consolidated
within the
State Department. Because it came during the holiday
season and in
the period immediately following President Clinton’s
impeachment, the move
received little attention. On October 1, 1999, USIA ceased
to exist.
(104) Ironically, the one Jackson Committee recommendation
ignored
by President Eisenhower had finally come to fruition.
What happened?
Until the
classified documents of the Clinton administration become
available, one
can only speculate. While the public debate over the
future of USIA
centered on budgetary issues, there appears to have been a
deeper, philosophical
debate under the surface. USIA was born of the Cold
War. With
the demise of the Soviet Union, many felt the agency had
outlived its mission.
However, as the events of September 11, 2001, would tragically
demonstrate,
the decline of communism did not leave the United States without
foreign
threats. If anything, the need to explain U.S. foreign
policy may
be greater today than ever.
It is also possible that
--
just as was the case a half-century earlier -- the
reorganization of overseas
communications programs may have been hastened by an internal
government
turf battle. It may well be that the same tensions that
Fitzhugh
said existed between the professional diplomats and professional
communicators
50 years ago -- and probably never entirely disappeared --
reintensified
under an atmosphere of budget cutting. It is also likely
that the
opinions of Secretary of State Madeline Albright, one of the
most popular
members of the scandal-ridden Clinton administration, carried
considerable
weight in the inner-governmental struggles that may have
ensued.
At a time President Clinton was fighting for his political life
-- the
Starr Report had been released and the House was engaged in an
impeachment
inquiry -- the survival of USIA was a presumably a low priority
item.
Whatever the real reason
for
USIA's demise, the move has been met with criticism. Former USIA
Foreign
Service Officer Kenton Keith has written that "public diplomacy
with State
may turn into a spin machine." (105) Nancy Snow, who has
written
extensively about USIA, wrote "the move suggests business as
usual." (106)
In many ways, these views echo the essential conflict outlined
in the 1948
Brookings Institute study -- whether U.S. propaganda should be
white, gray,
or some shade of gray.
The control and direction
of
U.S. overseas information programs remain issues at the start of
a new
century as much as they were in the middle of the last.
And much
of the debate that surrounded the Jackson Committee in 1953
remains relevant
a half-century later. It is still an area of great
interest that
merits future study.